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The incentive to trade under ambiguity aversion
Abstract
This paper examines the behavior of an exporting firm that sells in both the home coun-
try and a foreign country. The firm makes its optimal production and export decisions when
facing ambiguous exchange rate risk. Ambiguity is modeled by a second-order probability
distribution that captures the firm’s uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern
the exchange rate risk. Ambiguity preferences are modeled by the (second-order) expecta-
tion of a concave transformation of the (first-order) expected utility of profit conditional on
each plausible subjective distribution of the exchange rate risk. Within this framework, we
derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the ambiguity-averse firm optimally
sells more in the home country and exports less to the foreign country in response either
to the introduction of ambiguity or to greater ambiguity aversion when ambiguity prevails.
We further show that ambiguity and ambiguity aversion have adverse effect on the firm’s
incentive to export to the foreign country.
JEL classification: D21; D81; F31
Keywords: Ambiguity; Ambiguity aversion; Exports; Production
1. Introduction
The study of an exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty has been the subject of
considerable research in decision making under uncertainty (Katz and Paroush, 1979; Kawai
and Zilcha, 1986; Broll and Zilcha, 1992; Viaene and Zilcha, 1998; Wong, 2007; to name just
a few). The extant literature examines the production and export decisions of the exporting
firm using the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation. Such a
modeling approach rules out the possibility that the firm is unable to unambiguously assign
a probability distribution that uniquely describes the exchange rate risk, which gives rise
to ambiguity, or uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921).
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Since the seminal work of Ellsberg, ambiguity has been alluded to the violation of
the independence axiom, which is responsible for the decision criterion being linear in the
outcome probabilities. There are ample experiments (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Sarin
and Weber, 1993; Chow and Sarin, 2001) and surveys (Viscusi and Chesson, 1999; Chesson
and Viscusi, 2003) that document convincing evidence that individuals prefer gambles with
known rather than unknown probabilities, implying that ambiguity aversion prevails.
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate ambiguity into the model of an exporting firm
that sells in both the home country and a foreign country. Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji
(2005) have recently developed a powerful decision criterion known as “smooth ambiguity
aversion” that is compatible with ambiguity averse preferences under uncertainty (hereafter
referred to as the KMMmodel). The KMMmodel features the recursive structure that is far
more tractable in comparison to other models of ambiguity such as the pioneering maxmin
expected utility (or multiple-prior) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Specifically, the
KMM model represents ambiguity by a second-order probability distribution that captures
the firm’s uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern the exchange rate risk.
The KMM model then measures the firm’s expected utility under ambiguity by taking the
(second-order) expectation of a concave transformation of the (first-order) expected utility
of profit conditional on each plausible subjective distribution of the exchange rate risk. This
recursive structure creates a crisp separation between ambiguity and ambiguity aversion,
i.e., between beliefs and tastes, which allows us to study these two attributes independently.
Another nice feature of the KMM model is that we can apply the conventional techniques in
the decision making under uncertainty in the context of ambiguity (Taboga, 2005; Gollier,
2011; Snow, 2010, 2011; Alary et al., 2013; Wong, 2015, 2016).
Within the KMM model, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the
ambiguity-averse exporting firm optimally sells more in the home country and exports less
to the foreign country in response either to the introduction of ambiguity or to greater
ambiguity aversion when ambiguity prevails. We show that these conditions hold when the
firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion does not exceed unity and its subjective beliefs are
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ranked in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Barham et al. (2014) document
that the average coefficient of relative risk aversion is 0.8 in their sample of Midwestern
grain farmers in the U.S., which is in line with the magnitudes of relative risk aversion
found in many developing countries (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). Since exporting to
the foreign country exposes the firm to the exchange rate risk, the prevalence of ambiguity
creates additional risk to the ambiguity-averse firm. Hence, the firm finds it less attractive
to export to the foreign country in the presence than in the absence of ambiguity. This
result extends to the case of greater ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion
as such have adverse effect on the firm’s incentive to export to the foreign country.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the KMM model
of an exporting firm that sells in both the home country and a foreign country. The firm
faces ambiguous exchange rate uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921). Section 3 derives
the firm’s optimal production and export decisions. Section 4 examines how ambiguity
and ambiguity aversion affect the value of export to the foreign country. The final section
concludes.
2. The model
Consider an exporting firm that faces exchange rate uncertainty. There is one period
with two dates, 0 and 1. To begin, the firm produces a single homogeneous good in the
home country according to a known cost function, C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the level of output
and C(Q) is compounded to date 1. The firm’s production technology exhibits decreasing
returns to scale so that C(0) = C′(0) = 0, and C′(Q) > 0 and C′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.
At date 1, the firm sells its entire output, Q, in the home country and a foreign country.
The firm commits its allocation of output at date 0 such thatQd units of the good are sold in
the home market and the remaining units, Qf = Q−Qd, are exported to the foreign market,
where 0 ≤ Qd ≤ Q. The firm is a price taker in both the home and foreign markets. The
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selling price in the home market is Pd per unit, where Pd > 0 is denominated in the home
currency. On the other hand, the selling price in the foreign market is Pf per unit, where
Pf > 0 is denominated in the foreign currency.
1 The firm’s profit at date 1, denominated
in the home currency, is given by
Π˜ = PdQd + S˜PfQf −C(Qd +Qf ), (1)
where S˜ is the random spot exchange rate at date 1 and is expressed in units of the home
currency per unit of the foreign currency.2 The firm possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function, U(Π), defined over its home currency profit at date 1, Π, with U ′(Π) > 0
and U ′′(Π) < 0, indicating the presence of risk aversion.
The spot exchange rate, S˜, is distributed according to an objective cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF), F ◦(S), over support [S, S], where 0 ≤ S < S ≤ ∞. The firm
faces ambiguity in that it is uncertain about the objective CDF, F ◦(S). Succinctly, the
firm has a continuum of priors, {F (S|θ) : θ ∈ [θ, θ]}, where F (S|θ) denotes a plausible
first-order CDF of S˜ over support [S, S], which is sensitive to a parameter, θ, whose value is
not known ex ante. Based on its subjective information, the firm associates a second-order
CDF, G(θ), over the continuum of priors, i.e., over support [θ, θ], where −∞ ≤ θ < θ ≤ ∞.
This captures the firm’s uncertainty about which of the first-order CDF, F (S|θ), governs
the random spot exchange rate, S˜. Following Gollier (2011), Snow (2010, 2011), and Wong
(2015, 2016), we assume that the firm’s ambiguous beliefs are unbiased in the sense that
the expected exchange rate risk is equal to the objective exchange rate risk:
EG[F (S|θ˜)] = F
◦(S), (2)
for all S ∈ [S, S], where EG(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the second-order
CDF, G(θ).3
1Due to the segmentation of the home and foreign markets, arbitrage transactions are either impossible or
unprofitable, thereby invalidating the law of one price. See Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001) and Parsley and
Wei (1996) for supportive evidence that arbitrage transactions among national markets are indeed imperfect.
2Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
3The assumption that the expected exchange rate risk is equal to the objective exchange rate risk is
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The recursive structure of the KMM model implies that we can compute the firm’s
expected utility under ambiguity in three steps. First, we calculate the firm’s expected
utility for each first-order CDF of S˜. Second, we transform each (first-order) expected
utility obtained in the first step by an ambiguity function, ϕ(U), where ϕ′(U) > 0 and U is
the firm’s utility level. Finally, we take the (second-order) expectation of the transformed
expected utility obtained in the second step with respect to the second-order CDF of θ˜.
The firm’s ex-ante decision problem as such is given by
max
Qd≥0,Qf≥0
EG
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜)|θ˜]}
}
, (3)
where EF (·|θ) is the expectation operator with respect to the first-order CDF, F (S|θ), and
Π˜ is given by Eq. (1). Inspection of the objective function of program (3) reveals that the
effect of ambiguity, represented by the CDF, G(θ), and the effect of ambiguity preferences,
represented by the shape of ϕ(U), can be separated and thus studied independently.
We say that the firm is ambiguity averse if, for any given pair of domestic sales and
foreign exports, (Qd, Qf), the objective function of program (3) decreases when the firm’s
ambiguous beliefs, specified by G(θ), change in a way that induces a mean-preserving spread
in the distribution of the firm’s expected utility. According to this definition, Klibanoff et
al. (2005) show that ambiguity aversion implies concavity for ϕ(U), and that a concave
transformation of ϕ(U) results in greater ambiguity aversion. To see this, we define the
ambiguity aversion premium, Φ, as the solution to the following equation:
EG
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜)|θ˜]}
}
= ϕ
{
EG{EF [U(Π˜)|θ˜]} − Φ
}
. (4)
Hence, Φ measures the “pain” the firm is willing to suffer in order to get rid of the ambiguity.
It follows from Eq. (4) and Jensen’s inequality that Φ > 0 if, and only if, ϕ′′(U) < 0. To
compare ambiguity aversion, we define Φi by
EG
{
ϕi{EF [U(Π˜)|θ˜]}
}
= ϕi
{
EG{EF [U(Π˜)|θ˜]} −Φi
}
, (5)
motivated by the premise that the behavior of an ambiguity-neutral decision maker should be unaffected by
the introduction of, or changes in, ambiguity.
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for i = 1 and 2. It follows from Eq. (5) and Pratt (1964) that Φ1 < Φ2 if, and only if,
−ϕ′′
1
(U)/ϕ′
1
(U) < −ϕ′′
2
(U)/ϕ′
2
(U), which is equivalent to ϕ2(U) being a concave transfor-
mation of ϕ1(U). Throughout the paper, we assume that ϕ
′′(U) < 0 so that the firm is
ambiguity averse.
3. Optimal production and export decisions
In this section, we examine the firm’s production and export decisions. To have a non-
trivial problem, we assume hereafter that the expected marginal revenue from selling abroad
is greater than that from selling domestically:
EG[EF (S˜|θ˜)]Pf = EF◦(S˜)Pf > Pd, (6)
where EF◦(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the objective CDF, F
◦(S), and
the equality follows from Eq. (2). Condition (6) ensures that the firm optimally sells its
output in both the home and foreign countries.
Given that condition (6) holds, the first-order conditions for program (3) are given by
EG
{
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[Pd −C
′(Q∗)]|θ˜}
}
= 0, (7)
and
EG
{
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q∗)]|θ˜}
}
= 0, (8)
where an asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level and Q∗ = Q∗d + Q
∗
f . The second-order
conditions for program (3) are satisfied given the assumed properties of ϕ(U), u(Π), and
C(Q). Since ϕ′(U) > 0 and U ′(Π) > 0, Eq. (7) implies that C′(Q∗) = Pd. Hence, the firm’s
optimal output level, Q∗, depends neither on the firm’s attitude towards ambiguity nor on
the ambiguous exchange rate risk.
Trade under ambiguity aversion 7
To examine the effect of ambiguity on the firm’s optimal production and export decisions,
we consider a benchmark case wherein there is no ambiguity in that the firm knows the
objective CDF of S˜, i.e., F (S|θ) = F ◦(S) for all S ∈ [S, S] and θ ∈ [θ, θ]. In this benchmark
case, Eq. (7) and (8) reduce to
EF◦{U
′(Π˜◦)[Pd −C
′(Q◦)]} = 0, (9)
and
EF◦{U
′(Π˜◦)[S˜Pf − C
′(Q◦)]} = 0, (10)
where a nought (◦) indicates an optimal level in the absence of ambiguity and Q◦ = Q◦d+Q
◦
f .
We state and prove our first proposition.
Proposition 1. Introducing ambiguity to the ambiguity-averse exporting firm has no effect
on the firm’s optimal output level, i.e., Q∗ = Q◦. The firm optimally raises its domestic
sales and reduces its foreign exports, i.e., Q∗d > Q
◦
d and Q
∗
f < Q
◦
f , if, and only if, the
covariance between ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]} and EF{U
′(Π˜◦)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q◦)]|θ˜} is negative.
Proof. Since U ′(Π) > 0, Eq. (9) implies that C′(Q◦) = Pd. Hence, we have Q
∗ = Q◦.
Substituting Qd = Q
◦ −Qf into the objective function of program (3), we differentiate the
objective function with respect to Qf and evaluate the resulting derivative at Qf = Q
◦
f to
yield
EG
{
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜◦)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q◦)]|θ˜}
}
= EG
{
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]}
}
EF◦{U
′(Π˜◦)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q◦)]}
+CovG
{
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]},EF{U
′(Π˜◦)[S˜Pf − C
′(Q◦)]|θ˜}
}
= CovG
{
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]},EF{U
′(Π˜◦)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q◦)]|θ˜}
}
, (11)
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where the first equality follows from Eq. (2), the second equality follows from Eq. (10), and
CovG(·, ·) is the covariance operator with respect to the second-order CDF, G(θ). It then
follows from Eq. (8) that Q∗f < Q
◦
f if, and only if, the covariance term on the right-hand
side of Eq. (11) is negative. 2
Differentiating ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ]} with respect to θ yields
−
∫ S
S
ϕ′′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ]}U ′(Π◦)PfQ
◦
fFθ(S|θ)dS, (12)
where Fθ(S|θ) = ∂F (S|θ)/∂θ, and we have used integration by parts. Likewise, differenti-
ating EF{U
′(Π˜◦)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q◦)]|θ} with respect to θ yields
Pf
∫ S
S
{
U ′(Π◦)[R(Π◦)− 1] + [C′(Q◦)Q◦ − C(Q◦)]U ′′(Π◦)
}
Fθ(S|θ)dS, (13)
where R(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π) is the firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion, and we
have used integration by parts and the fact that Pd = C
′(Q◦). Since C(0) = 0, the strict
convexity of C(Q) implies that C′(Q) > C(Q)/Q for all Q > 0. If R(Π) ≤ 1 and θ ranks
F (S|θ) in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, it follows from Eqs. (12) and (13)
that the covariance between ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
◦)|θ˜]} and EF{U
′(Π˜◦)[S˜Pf − C
′(Q◦)]|θ˜} is indeed
negative so that Q∗d > Q
◦
d and Q
∗
f < Q
◦
f .
We now examine the effect of greater ambiguity aversion on the firm’s optimal produc-
tion and export decisions when ambiguity prevails. Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that the
firm becomes more ambiguity averse when ϕ(U) is replaced by K[ϕ(U)] in the objective
function of program (3), where K(·) satisfies that K ′(·) > 0 and K ′′(·) < 0. The more
ambiguity-averse firm’s ex-ante decision problem is given by
max
Qd≥0,Qf≥0
EG
{
K
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜)|θ˜]}
}}
, (14)
The first-order conditions for program (14) are given by
EG
{
K ′
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
)|θ˜]}
}
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜)[Pd −C
′(Q)]|θ˜}
}
= 0, (15)
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and
EG
{
K ′
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
)|θ˜]}
}
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q)]|θ˜}
}
= 0, (16)
where a diamond () indicates an optimal level. We state and prove the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 2. Making the ambiguity-averse exporting firm more ambiguity averse by
replacing ϕ(U) by K[ϕ(U)] has no effect on the firm’s optimal output level, i.e., Q =
Q∗. The firm optimally raises its domestic sales and reduces its foreign exports, i.e.,
Qd > Q
∗
d and Q

f < Q
∗
f , if, and only if, the covariance between K
′{ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}} and
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q∗)]|θ˜} is negative.
Proof. Since K ′(·) > 0, ϕ′(U) > 0, and U ′(Π) > 0, Eq. (15) implies that C′(Q) = Pd.
Hence, we have Q∗ = Q. Substituting Qd = Q
∗−Qf into the objective function of program
(14), we differentiate the objective function with respect to Qf and evaluate the resulting
derivative at Qf = Q
∗
f to yield
EG
{
K ′
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q∗)]|θ˜}
}
= EG
{
K ′
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}}
EG
{
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf − C
′(Q∗)]|θ˜}
}
+CovG
{
K ′
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
, ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf − C
′(Q∗)]|θ˜}
}
= CovG
{
K ′
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
, ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q∗)]|θ˜}
}
, (17)
where the second equality follows from Eq. (8). It then follows from Eq. (16) that Qf < Q
∗
f
if, and only if, the covariance term on the right-hand side of Eq. (17) is negative. 2
Suppose that an increase in θ always deteriorates F (S|θ) in the sense of first-order
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stochastic dominance, i.e., Fθ(S|θ) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ [S, S] and θ ∈ [θ, θ].
4 Differentiating
K ′{ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}} with respect to θ yields
−
∫ S
S
K ′′
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}
}
ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}U ′(Π∗)PfQ
∗
fFθ(S|θ)dS, (18)
where we have used integration by parts. Eq. (18) implies that K ′{ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}} is
increasing in θ. Differentiating EF {U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf − C
′(Q∗)]|θ} with respect to θ yields
Pf
∫ S
S
{
U ′(Π∗)[R(Π∗)− 1] + [C′(Q∗)Q∗ − C(Q∗)]U ′′(Π∗)
}
Fθ(S|θ)dS, (19)
where we have used integration by parts and the fact that Pd = C
′(Q∗). If R(Π) ≤ 1, Eq.
(19) implies that EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf − C
′(Q∗)]|θ} is decreasing in θ. From Proposition 1, we
have Q∗f < Q
◦
f so that Eq. (10) imply that
EG
{
EF {U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf − C
′(Q∗)]|θ˜}
}
> 0. (20)
Since EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf − C
′(Q∗)]|θ} is decreasing in θ, Eq. (20) implies that there exists a
unique point, θ1 ∈ (θ, θ) such that EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q∗)]|θ} > (<) 0 for all θ < (>) θ1.
Using Eq. (8), we can write the left-hand side of Eq. (17) as
EG
{{
K ′
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
−K ′
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ1]}
}}
×ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q∗)]|θ˜}
}
. (21)
Since K ′{ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ]}} is increasing in θ, the right-hand side of Eq. (21) must be
negative. It then follows from Eq. (17) that the covariance between K ′{ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}}
and ϕ′{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}EF{U
′(Π˜∗)[S˜Pf −C
′(Q∗)]|θ˜} is indeed negative so that Qd > Q
∗
d and
Qf < Q
∗
f .
Before leaving this section, it is worth pointing out the difference between the impact
of risk aversion and that of ambiguity aversion. If the firm is purely risk averse, it is
4The case wherein an increase in θ always improves F (S|θ) in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance
gives the same result.
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well-known that introducing exchange rate risk or greater risk aversion always induces the
risk-averse firm to sell more in the home country and export less to the foreign country.
However, these results hold under ambiguity aversion if, and only if, the necessary and
sufficient conditions stated in Propositions 1 and 2 are satisfied. As shown above, if the
firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion, R(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π), far exceeds unity, the
necessary and sufficient conditions stated in Propositions 1 and 2 would be violated. In this
case, introducing ambiguity or greater ambiguity aversion would then induce the ambiguity-
averse firm to sell less in the home country and export more to the foreign country.
4. The value to export
In this section, we examine the firm’s incentive to export to the foreign country. When
ambiguity prevails, the firm’s optimal domestic sales and foreign exports are Q∗d and Q
∗
f ,
respectively. We define the certainty equivalent, CE∗, as the solution to the following
equation:
ϕ[U(CE∗)] = EG
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
. (22)
When there is no ambiguity, the firm’s optimal domestic sales and foreign exports are Q◦d
and Q◦f , respectively. In this case, we define the certainty equivalent, CE
◦, as the solution
to the following equation:
ϕ[U(CE◦)] = ϕ{EF◦ [U(Π˜
◦)]}. (23)
Comparing CE∗ and CE◦ yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Introducing ambiguity to the ambiguity-averse exporting firm reduces the
certainty equivalent, thereby reducing the value to export to the foreign country.
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Proof. Since ϕ′′(U) < 0, Jensen’s inequality implies that
EG
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
< ϕ
{
EG{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
= ϕ{EF◦[U(Π˜
∗)]}, (24)
where the equality follows from Eq. (2). Since Q◦d and Q
◦
f are the firm’s optimal domestic
sales and foreign exports, respectively, in the absence of ambiguity, it must be true that
ϕ{EF◦[U(Π˜
◦)]} > ϕ{EF◦ [U(Π˜
∗)]}. (25)
Eqs. (24) and (25) imply that
EG
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
< ϕ{EF◦ [U(Π˜
◦)]}. (26)
It then follows from Eqs. (22), (23), and (26) that CE∗ < CE◦. 2
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. Exporting to the foreign country exposes
the firm to the exchange rate risk. The presence of ambiguity creates additional risk to
the ambiguity-averse exporting firm. Hence, the firm finds it less attractive to export
to the foreign country in the presence than in the absence of ambiguity, rendering that
CE∗ < CE◦. Ambiguity as such reduces the value to export.
When the firm becomes more ambiguity averse in that ϕ(U) is replaced by K[ϕ(U)],
where K(·) satisfies that K ′(·) > 0 and K ′′(·) < 0, the firm’s optimal domestic sales and
foreign exports are Qd and Q

f , respectively. In this case, we define the certainty equivalent,
CE, as the solution to the following equation:
K{ϕ[U(CE)]} = EG
{
K
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
)|θ˜]}
}}
. (27)
Comparing CE∗ and CE yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Making the ambiguity-averse exporting firm more ambiguity averse reduces
the certainty equivalent, thereby reducing the value to export to the foreign country.
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Proof. Since K ′′(·) < 0, Jensen’s inequality implies that
EG
{
K
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
)|θ˜]}
}}
< K
{
EG
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
)|θ˜]}
}}
. (28)
Since Q∗d and Q
∗
f are the optimal domestic sales and foreign sales, respectively, when the
firm’s smooth ambiguity preferences are represented by ϕ(U), it must be true that
EG
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}
> EG
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
)|θ˜]}
}
. (29)
Eqs. (28) and (29) imply that
EG
{
K
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
)|θ˜]}
}}
< K
{
EG
{
ϕ{EF [U(Π˜
∗)|θ˜]}
}}
. (30)
It then follows from Eqs. (22), (27), and (30) that CE < CE∗. 2
The intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows. When the firm is more ambiguity averse,
exporting to the foreign country becomes less attractive as the firm has to be exposed to
the exchange rate risk. Hence, the certainty equivalent decreases in a systematic manner
with greater ambiguity aversion.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the production and export decisions of an exporting
firm that sells in both the home country and a foreign country. The firm’s preferences
exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion developed by Klibanoff et al. (2005). The KMM model
represents ambiguity by a second-order probability distribution that captures the firm’s
uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern the exchange rate risk. On the other
hand, the KMM model specifies ambiguity preferences by the (second-order) expectation
of a concave transformation of the (first-order) expected utility of profit conditional on
each plausible subjective distribution of the exchange rate risk. Within this framework, we
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have derived necessary and sufficient conditions under which the ambiguity-averse exporting
firm optimally sells more in the home country and exports less to the foreign country in
response either to the introduction of ambiguity or to greater ambiguity aversion when
ambiguity prevails. We have further shown that the firm finds it less attractive to export
to the foreign country in the presence than in the absence of ambiguity, and with greater
ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion as such have adverse effect on the
firm’s incentive to export to the foreign country.
While we have focused on the exporting firm’s incentive to trade under ambiguity aver-
sion, we deliberately exclude the possibility that the ambiguity exchange rate risk is hedge-
able. It goes without saying that currency hedging is likely to reduce the exchange rate risk,
thereby enhancing the value to export. As long as perfect hedging is not implementable,
our qualitative results should remain intact. Another interesting extension is to expose the
exporting firm to other sources of uncertainty such as political risk, business risk, and price
risk. Indeed, not much has been done for the decision making under multiple sources of
ambiguity. We leave these challenges for future research.
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